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of debentures by hindering the corporation in the successful prosecution of its
business, particularly in times of crisis. These objections apply of course to
the existence of such restrictive covenants rather than their enforcement, and
make a strong case from the financial point of view for the complete aboli-
tion of such covenants, leaving no form of security intermediate between
the mortgage bond and -the unsecured debenture. It is, however, for the
management to consider these objections when debentures with negative
pledge clauses are issued and to weigh them against the possible benefits of
clauses purporting to give more safety to holders than a simple promise to
pay the face amount of the debenture. It seems both practical and reason-
able to urge that holders of debentures be assured by statute that the terms
of indentures and covenants in debentures, voluntarily assumed by the issuer,
shall mean what they say.
PROVISIONS FOR NON-ASSENTING CLASSES OF
CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS
THrE power to force small groups of creditors to accept a reorganization
plan of which they do not approve is one of the crucial features of the reform
embodied in Section 77B 6f the Bankruptcy Act. Subsections (e) (1) and
(g) provide that all dissenters shall be bound to accept securities under a
plan of reorganization which has been approved as fair and equitable by the
court and accepted by two-thirds in amount of each class of creditors and
by the holders of a majority of the stock of each class.' Further, Section 77B
authorizes the confirmation of a plan which has been found by the court to
be fair and equitable even without the consent of two-thirds of a class of
creditors on certain conditions. Subsection (b) (5) requires that, for each
class of creditors of which less than two-thirds shall accept the plan, adequate
protection shall be provided, either (a) by the transfer or retention of the
property subject to their claims or liens; or (b) by a sale free of liens at not
less than a fair upset price, and the transfer of the liens to the proceeds of
1. Bankruptcy Act §77B(e) (1), (g), 11 U.S.C. §207(e)(1), (g) (Supp. 1935).
Section 77B also eliminates the necessity of the judicial sale, which was criticized
as a useless and merely formal part of the equity procedure. See note 20, infra. And
the bankruptcy court under Section 77B takes jurisdiction over all property of the
deb:or, wherever situated, thus eliminating the expense and difficulty incident to the
appointment of ancillary receivers in each district where property of the debtor was
located, as was necessary in equity. See Billig, Corporate Reorganication: Equity vs.
Bankruptcy (1933) 17 MINx. L. REv. 237, 255.
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the sale; or (c) by appraisal and payment in cash of the value either of such
claims, or, at the creditors' election, of the securities allotted to such claims
under the plan; or (d) by such method as will in the opinion of the judge
equitably and fairly provide such protection.2
There have been few judicial interpretations of this subsection. Methods
(a) and (b), providing for a retention of liens and claims, are hardly open
to constitutional objection, for both have long been employed in equity re-
ceivership reorganizations.3 The first method-sale or retention of the prop-
erty subject to existing liens-is comparable to the equity practice of effecting
a reorganization without disturbing underlying first mortgages; while the
second-sale at a fair upset price and transfer of liens to the proceeds of the
sale-is the usual means of reorganizing under the equity procedure. Method
(d), obviously intended as a catch-all clause, has been described as no
"method" at all, and it has been held that it will not be used to deprive a
secured creditor of his security unless a substitute of the most undeniable
equivalence is given.4 This limitation upon the effective scope of method
(d), while it seems entirely reasonable, will restrict its potential application
considerably.
The third method, (c), providing for discharge of the claims of a non-
assenting class of creditors by cash payment of the appraised value of their
securities, is an innovation in reorganization procedure5 which promises to
be of considerable utility in making the reorganization process more effective.
But statutory amendment may be necessary if the possibilities of subsection
(b) (5) (c) are to be realized, for its constitutionality has been successfully
questioned in the lower federal courts. One District Court, in refusing to
apply method (c) to the claims of first mortgage bondholders under a plan
which it found to be neither fair nor feasible, expressed the view that the
subsection did not expressly grant the right "to arbitrarily appraise a whole
2. Bankruptcy Act §77B(b) (5), 11 U.S. C. §207(b) (5) (Supp. 1935).
3. See Gerdes, Protisions for Dissenting Classes of Creditors in a Plan of Reor-
ganization (1936) 2 CoRP. REORG. 407.
4. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935).
5. A similar provision appeared in the railroad reorganization section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act in its original form. 47 STAT. 1474, 11 U.S.C. §205(e) (1934). Section
77(e) as amended in 1935, 49 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. § 205(e) (Supp. 1935), however, elim-
inates this provision and goes further, providing that submission of a plan to a class
of creditors shall not be required if the Interstate Commerce Commission and the court
determine that the interests of such class "have no value," and the court is empowered
to confirm a plan not accepted by two-thirds of a class whose consent would otherwise
be required if the court concludes that the plan "make adequate provisions for fair
and equitable treatment for the interests or claims of those rejecting it" and that "such
rejection is not reasonably justified in the light of the respective rights and interests
of those rejecting it and all the relevant facts! ' See Friendly, Amendment of the
Railroad Reorganication Act (1936) 36 CoL. I REv. 27. Judicial interpretations of
either the old or new provisions of Section 77 are lacking.
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class of creditors out of the picture", and that such a grant, if made, would
be unconstitutional. 6 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
the case of In re Tennessee Publishing Company 7 went further and declared
the subsection unconstitutional, at least as to secured creditors. In that case,
after three successive plans of reorganization had been submitted, each of
which was opposed by all interests concerned except a relatively small number
of unsecured creditors, the debtor invoked subsection (b) (5), proposing,
inter alia, to pay non-assenting bondholders the appraised value of their se-
curities in cash. The court held that the plan was not presented in good
faith within the meaning of the statute, in that the proposal was not feasible,8
and held further, in order to forestall further useless proposals by the debtor,
that subsection (b) (5) (c) was invalid under the Fifth Amendment, since it
deprived a secured creditor of the right to have the property sold at a public
sale at which such creditor could protect his interest by bidding. One judge
dissented from the majority's definition of "good faith" but concurred in the
holding as to constitutionality.
In each of the two cases construing subsection (b) (5) (c), it seems clear
that the constitutional issue was prematurely considered, for in neither case
was the proposed plan found by the court to be fair. Without a preliminary
finding of fairness as well as feasibility, subsection (b) (5) cannot be ap-
plied, and it is difficult to see, under the facts of the Tennessee Publishing
Company case, how section (b) (5) (c) could be an immediate threat to
any of the dissenting creditors' constitutional rights.9
Utility of Subsection (b) (5) (c). As a practical matter, Section 77B will
not become a nullity with the invalidation of subsection (b) (5) (c). 10 Dis-
senting creditors, secured and unsecured, may still be bound by a plan affect-
ing their interests if the court finds it fair and equitable, and if it is accepted
by two-thirds of their class. On the other hand, a comprehensive reorganiza-
tion statute should contain some provision for dealing with a class of creditors,
the consent of two-thirds of which cannot be obtained. Subsection (b) (5),
which covers this case, is ambiguous in that it seems to permit the confirma-
tion of a plan with an unlimited number of classes of creditors still in dissent.
It is conceivable, reading subsections (b) (4) and (b) (5) together, that a
6. In re Preble Corp., 12 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Me. 1935).
7. 81 F. (2d) 463 (C.C.A. 6th, 1936), (1936) 84 U. PA. L. REv. 780, (1936)
5 FORDHAm L. REv. 349.
8. Section 77B requires that a plan must be presented in "good faith," and this
has been construed as requiring feasibility of the plan as well as honesty of purpose.
See Comment (1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 283.
9. Cf. Developments in the Law-Reorganization under Section 77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1111, 1189. By the admission of the Court, the
decision on the constitutional question was not necessary to the disposition of the case.
81 F. (2d) 463, 467.
10. Gerdes, loc. cit. suepra note 3.
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plan of reorganization might be moulded and confirmed by the judge without
the consent of either creditors or stockholders." As a practical matter, how-
ever, this possibility is limited by the discretion of the courts and their re-
luctance to formulate a plan for the parties; and further, at least under
methods (b) (5) (b) and (c), by the difficulty of raising cash with which
to pay off the non-assenting creditors. The subsection could well be amended
to describe more dearly the situation toward which it is directed-the case
where a small but recalcitrant class of creditors is blocking a reorganization
approved by other classes and the court. From the standpoint of the re-
organizer some such provision is essential, for otherwise 34% of any small
class of creditors might block a reorganization to which substantially all the
other creditors had assented-' While subsection (b) (5) has been at issue
in few cases and there are no statistics as to the consequences of its appli-
cation, the mere threat of its existence may have influenced would-be dis-
senters to change their minds.
It may be contended that methods (a) and (b) provided in subsection (b)
(5) furnish teclmiques adequate to deal with recalcitrant creditors, where
less than two-thirds of each interested class accept the plan. But sale or
retention of the property subject to liens under (a) would be of no service
to a corporation in need of having its secured debt structure scaled down. And
sale of the property at a fair upset price under (b) involves a return to the
expensive formality of a judicial sale. Appraisal has several practical ad-
vantages over upset price as a means of measuring creditors' caims, from the
point of view both of the creditor and of the debtor. Subsection (b) (5) (c)
seems definitely to add to the economy and effectiveness of the reorganization
process, and it is worth saving, if the Constitution and the courts will permit.
Constitutionality of Subsection (b) (5) (c). The substitution of onerous
duties of active administration 13 for the traditional role of the judge as passive
arbiter of competing claims, effected by Section 77B, might have been one of
the intangible factors influencing the decision in the Teinessec Publishing
Company case. The appraisal provided under subsection (b) (5) (c), which
is the final basis for the satisfaction of the claims of dissenting creditors,
carries to an extreme an administrative technique in which judges are re-
luctant to acquiesce.
11. Legis. (1934) 21 VA. L. Ray. 93, 99.
12. See Swmaine, Corporate Rcorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Power
(1933) 19 VA. L. Rzv. 317, 330.
13. It has been suggested that reorganization should be effectuated with the aid
of a board of impartial arbitrators acquainted with and trained in business problems.
Phillips, A Business Tribunal for Corporate Reorganizations (1933) 11 H~nv. Bus.
Rav. 178. Others, notably the banking interests, oppose excessive judicial supervision
of the plan with a view to keeping reorganization under the control of business groups.
See Dodd, Reorganization through Bankruptcy: a Remedy for What? (1935) 48 HAnv.
L. Rav. 1100.
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Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the Rock Island case,' 4 there
can be little doubt that Section 77B in its general aspects is constitutional as
an exercise of the bankruptcy power. In affirming an order enjoining the
holder of collateral notes of a railroad, which had petitioned for reorganiza-
tion under Section 77, from selling the collateral and so causing irreparable
loss to the estate, the Court in that case held that Section 77 was a valid law
on the subject of bankruptcies, indistinguishable in principle from the prior
bankruptcy acts authorizing compositions with creditors.'5 In view of the
similarity between Section 77B and Section 77 as it then stood, the decision is
practically controlling as to the constitutionality of the former in its general
scope, and subsequent lower court decisions so hold.10 The first limitation
ever to be placed upon the scope of the federal bankruptcy power was the
recent holding in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford' 7 that the
impairment of contractual rights by bankruptcy legislation may, under some
circumstances, constitute a deprivation of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
The validity of subsection (b) (5) (c), however, has not yet been passed
upon by the Supreme Court. The ground for holding that provision invalid,
on the authority of the Radford case, in In re Tennessee Publishing Com-
pany, was that a secured creditor has a substantive property right, impaired
by subsection (b) (5) (c), to have either payment of his debt in full or the
property subject to the lien-i.e. the right to have the property sold at a
public sale and to protect his interest then by bidding in the property. In
considering the constitutionality of subsection (b) (5) (c) against the back-
ground of the Radford case it may be -helpful to examine the customary dis-
position of the claims of non-assenting creditors in corporate reorganizations,
for the circumstances of business and prior equity usage may be decisive here
in establishing standards of fairness for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
.Equity Receivership Procedure. In an equity receivership,' 8 reorganization
is accomplished through a foreclosure of the first mortgage on the property
and a "public" sale of the property free of liens to the new corporation, se-
curities of the new corporation being exchanged for those of the old in ac-
14. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S.
648 (1935).
15. 30 STAT. 549 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §30 (1934).
16. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 581 (1935); In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) ;
Grand Boulevard Inv. Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935); In re
Pierce-Arrow Sales Corp., 10 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Hotel Gibson
Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.Ohio, 1935).
17. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
18. On equity receivership procedure in general, see Billig, supra note 1; Dodd,
supra note 13; Swaine, supra note 12; ROSEND EG, SWAINE AND WALKER, CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL COURT (1924).
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cordance with the plan of reorganization, dissenting creditors being paid off in
cash according to their pro rata share of the price realized at the sale. While
formally this procedure is similar to that used in foreclosing a unitary mort-
gage on a farm or city lot, as a practical matter it is much different. A judicial
sale of a railroad or a large industrial corporation is necessarily a form, for
the large values involved make competitive bidding practically impossible. To
protect the insolvent corporation against an unduly low price the equity court
sets an upset price below which it will consider no bids.10 Outside bids are
seldom attracted, for the reorganization committee can turn in the claims
deposited with it as a large part of the price, while other bidders must pay
cash ;20 in any event, potential bidders are aware that the claimants repre-
sented by the committee have too great a stake in salvaging their interest in
the old corporation to permit its assets to be sold to outsiders at a low figure.
Furthermore, an insolvent firm is not often an attractive bargain to out-
siders, since claims are rarely cut sufficiently, granted the bargaining power
of the creditors, to make the firm's earning prospects imposing. The fore-
closure sale, besides removing liens, serves also to define the right of an in-
dividual bondholder if he chooses to be paid in cash his pro rata share of the
price -realized instead of accepting securities under the plan; one of the chief.
practical objects of the upset price is to provide a measure for cash payments
to dissenting creditors. 21 In fixing an upset price the court must reconcile
the interests of the minority, whose claims are in effect evaluated by such
determination, and those of the majority, who must raise cash for the expenses
of reorganization and the payment of dissenters. In the majority of cases, the
only feasible price is the highest that, in the opinion of the court, vill permit
the reorganization to succeed;22 and the majority, which can refuse to bid
if the price is set too high, obviously has a considerable influence on the price
set.23 While there has been no institutional study of upset prices, there is
good evidence that such prices are usually set low enough to make it ad-
vantageous for most dissenters to accept securities under the plan in prefer-
ence to cash payment.24 It is clear that setting an upset price for the sale of
19. See WVehle, Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the Banhraptcy Act:
New Legislation Suiggested (1934) 44 Y..E L. J. 197, 213.
20. See Louisville Trust !Po. v. Louisville, N.A. & C Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 6M-3
(1899); Dodd, supra note 13, at 1123; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some
Aspects of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L. Rm 541, 554; Swaine supra
note 12, at 324.
21. See Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorgan-
ization (1927) 27 CoL L. REv. 132, 137.
22. Id. at 142.
23. See Frank, supra note 20, at 555, 5634; Kahn, The New Corporate Re-Organ-
ization Statute (1934) 9 J. N. A. REF. BANKEp. 11.
24. See Weiner, supra note 21, at 143-5; Sabel, The Corporate Reorganization Act
(1934) 19 MxNx. L. Rv. 34, 42.
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a large corporation in an equity receivership, where competitive bidding is
practically nonexistent, closely resembles at many points an appraisal of the
interests of dissenting creditors under subsection (b) (5) (c) of 77B or any
of the comparable appraisal statutes. The retention of the formality of a sale
has been strongly criticized because it serves to divert the attention of the
court from the fairness of the plan, and appraisal of the claims of dissenters
has been suggested as a more equitable way to handle the problem even in
equity receivership.
25
A limitation upon the efficacy of the sale to cut off the rights of dissenting
creditors is found in the doctrine of the Boyd case2 G to the effect that no
interest in stockholders can be recognized in a plan of reorganization without
also recognizing and preserving all prior interests in the property. This
doctrine does not, however, require payment in cash to unsecured creditors
before stockholders can be allowed participation.2 7 A fair offer of securities
under a plan has been held sufficient to bind such dissenting creditors.
28
In the light of this background of reorganization practice in equity receiver-
ships, we may return to the question of the constitutionality of the appraisal
and payment in cash of the value of the claims of a non-assenting group of
creditors under Section 77B(b) (5) (c). The formulas invoked to settle
the propriety of an equitable decree are not dissimilar from those used by the
courts in assessing the reasonableness of an act'of Congress under the Fifth
Amendment. It is not improbable that a reorganization practice which the
courts would pass as fair in an equity receivership will also be accepted as
within the constitutional limits of due process when embodied in a reorgani-
zation statute.
There are two general types of situations in which subsection (b) (5) (c)
may be invoked: first, where senior classes of creditors, whose claims are
generally secured by liens, are seeking to force a plan upon non-assenting
junior classes, usually in an unsecured position, and second, where junior
classes are seeking to force a plan upon prior creditors.20 The answer to the
constitutional question may well be different in the two cases.8 0 While both
25. See Frank, supra note 20, at 557, 713.
26. Northern Pac. Ry. v. 'Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). This holding was fore-
shadowed in Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674 (1899).
27. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 509 (1913).
28. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123 (E.D.Mo. 1918). And
the securities offered need not be superior in grade to any that the stockholders may
obtain. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
29. Each of the cases in which doubt has been cast on the constitutionality of sub-
section (b) (5) (c) falls within the latter class. The property in each was worth
less than the amount of the first mortgage debt, but junior creditors were attempting
to buy out the first mortgage bondholders on the basis of an appraisal. In neither case
w2s the plan found to be either feasible or fair, and thus the application of the sub-
section was not properly involved.
30. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 33.
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secured and unsecured claims are property rights within the protection of the
Constitution 31 in the past unsecured creditors have been treated with con-
siderably less deference than holders of secured interests.
Unsecured Creditors. Prior to Section 77B, claims of unsecured creditors
were reduced and settled without a sale in two instances, aside from their
discharge in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors may be constitutionally forced
to accept compositions in bankruptcy, under which a dissenting creditor is
deprived of his right to have the debtor's property sold for the satisfaction of
his debt, when the composition agreement is accepted by a majority of the
creditors and confirmed by the court.32 And in equity receivership the formal
sale has occassionaily been dispensed with as a means of determining the
rights of unsecured creditors. In Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway ConmpanV33 a dissenting unsecured creditor was forced, without a
sale, to accept securities under a plan which had been accepted by 95% of the
class; and in Coriell v. Morris Whitc, Inc.3 4 it was held that the interests of
dissenting creditors could be evaluated without the formality of a sale by an
appraisal on the basis of a hypothetical price set by the court as the price
which would have been received at a public sale. Since both in compositions
in bankruptcy and equity receiverships dissenting unsecured creditors have
been held bound where the consent of a substantial number of them has been
backed by the approval of the court, it would appear to follow that such
creditors may 'e similarly bound under Section 77B to accept securities of-
fered under a plan of reorganization which has ".-en accepted by tvo-thirds of
each class and approved by the court. 3
While the cases seem to indicate that an unsecured creditor may be deprived
of his right to have the debtor's property sold on execution if a substantial
31. See In re Burgh. 7 F. Supp. 184, 185 (N.D.Ill. 1933) (holding constitutional
§ 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C. § 202, providing for compromise or extension
of secured debts by consent of a majority of the creditors); WArN, B.%N;xtprcV
rN UNITD STATS HisToRy (1935) 157; Rosenberg. ReorganiZalion-Th Next Step
in CoaoRa-E REORGANIZATION AND THE FEER.AL COURT (1924) 76; cf. Rosenberg,
Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. in CoRtnxTE REoRGANIZATIO., AND
THE FEDEP.L Cot-ar (1924) 134.
32. In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11, 673 (S.D. N.Y. 1874), aff'd. 20 Fed. Cas.
No. 11, 675 (C. C. S. D. X.Y. 1875) ; Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 U. S. 217 (1880) ; Cumber-
land Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt & Co., 237 U.S. 447 (1915); Myers v. International
Trust Co., 273 U.S. 380 (1927).
33. 284 Fed. 945 (C.C.A. 8th, 1922), cert. granted, 261 U.S. 611, dismlssed per
stipulation, 262 U.S. 762 (1923). See criticism of this case in Harding v. American
Sumatra Tobacco Co., 14 F. (2d) 163, 169 (N.D.Ga. 1926). See also Frank, .supra
note 20, at 562-3; Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 31, at 124 et seq.
34. 54 F. (2d) 255 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931), rc,'d on other grounds sub non. National
Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426 (1933). See Frank, supra note 20, at 716-18;
Swaine, supra note 12, at 325-6.
35. This provision has been held valid. In re Pierce-Arrow Sales Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
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number of his class consent, they do not cover the case where -such consent
is lacking. In an equity receivership there is no requirement of any per-
centage of consent on the part of the unsecured creditors, who have merely
the alternative of accepting securities under the plan or of taking the cash
value of their interests as a pro rata part of the upset price. The consent
of substantial numbers in equity may be some indication to the court that
the plan is not grossly arbitrary, and a practical limit to the number of
dissenters to a plan is the fact that those who consent must raise the cash
to pay off dissenters. And under the dictum of the Boyd case, where the
value of the property is less than the first mortgage debt, unsecured credi-
tors need be given a fair offer of securities under the plan only if stockholders
are also allowed to participate.
There seem then to be two practical differences between the equity prac-
tice as to unsecured creditors, already approved by the courts, and the
appraisal rule under subsection (b) (5) (c). In the first place Section 77B
(b) (5) (c) does not specify any percentage of consents required before
dissenting creditors will be given the choice of accepting cash under an
appraisal or securities under a plan. In equity receiverships "substantial
support" of the plan is required; but it seems unlikely that a court would
find a plan "fair" within the meaning of 77B (b) (5) if it were not sup-
ported by a substantial part of each class, or at least of all classes of creditors,
even if two-thirds support by each class cannot be mobilized. In the second
place there is no sale under the appraisal method at which creditors may
bid to protect their interests. Since an upset price and an appraisal are
quite similar as means of valuation, at least in terms of consequences, it
would seem that a class of unsecured creditors which has rejected a plan
found to be fair is at least as well protected under Section 77B(b) (5) (c),
with its possibility of appraisal and payment in cash, as under the equity
procedure. Furthermore in the case of unsecured creditors the right to bid
at the sale is practically valueless, for prior secured creditors have too large
a stake in the old corporation to permit its assets to be sold at a price low
enough to attract the bids of junior creditors, who must advance sufficient
cash to buy out all prior interests if their bid is to be successful. The changes
in equity practice effected by the act in respect to the rights of unsecured
creditors seem so slight and so practical that little basis can be discerned
for declaring subsection (b) (5) (c) unreasonable within the prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment.
From the point of view of procedural due process as a constitutional right,
indeed, it may be that under an appraisal statute individual dissenters, whether
secured or unsecured, have a greater opportunity to be heard, and even to
obstruct the reorganization, than in a reorganization where their payment
is fixed as a share of an upset price. The possibility of successful objection
on appeal to an upset price fixed by a judge is narrowly limited, especially
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with respect to creditors junior to the class whose mortgage is being fore-
closed, for the whole theory of the judicial sale runs counter to its being
set aside except for fraud or other extreme causeY0O But every appraisal
must by definition affect an individual class of claims, probably privileging
members of that class to appeal. And while an appeal from such an appraisal
would not lie as of right under the Bankruptcy Act3T but would be discre-
tionary with the appellate court,38 it is likely that the courts would be found
ready, if the experience under stockholders' appraisal statutes is a guide,30
to review such appraisals, at least as to the proper bases for valuation.
Secured Creditors. In its special application to the claims of secured credi-
tors, as where junior classes seek to put through a plan without the
consent of prior mortgage bondholders, the constitutionality, of this sub-
section is more doubtful. Sections 77 and 77B are unique in bankruptcy
legislation in their treatment of secured creditors, both in the appraisal pro-
vision in question and in the provision for binding dissenting secured creditors
by a plan approved by two-thirds of their class and by the court. Under
prior bankruptcy statutes, the liens of secured creditors have always sur-
vived, the trustee in bankruptcy taking title to the bankrupt's 'property
subject to valid liens existing four months prior to the filing of the peti-
tion.40 But under earlier statutes it was found to be within the power of
Congress to permit the bankruptcy court to determine the validity of such
liens and to decree the method of their liquidation, 41 as by sale free of liens
and transfer of the liens to the proceeds of the sale, although such procedure
may have deprived the creditor of the specific remedy which vs provided
for him in his contract.4 3 In spite of inroads of this nature, accepted by the
36. Generally, a sale will not be set aside for mere inadequacy of consideration.
See (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960, 961. But cf. First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U.S.
504 (1934) (sale set aside a- fraudulent conveyance .,here upset price was far below
scrap value); Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. ,V. 556 (1933).
37. Appeals as of right are limited to certain specified cases, under which an appeal
from an appraisal probably could not be classified. Bankruptcy Act §25(a); 11 U.S.
C. §48(a) (Supp. 1935).
38. An appraisal would probably be classified as a "proceeding" in bankruptcy, an
appeal from which takes the form of a petition to superintend and revise in matter of
law only. Bankruptcy Act §24(b), 11 U. S. C. §47(b) (Supp. 1935).
39. Cf. NEv Yoax STocK ConrpoamION LAW, §21; Matter of Fulton, 257 N.Y.
487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931).
40. Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165 (1902); In re Cyclopean Co., 167 Fed. 971
(C.C.A. 2d, 1909) (secured creditor not relinquishing security holds it against trustee
in bankruptcy); Comment (1932) 17 Msir. L. REv. 47.
41. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).
42. Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931).
43. In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625 (C.C.A. 9th, 1905) (creditor
may be restrained from exercising power of immediate sale under trust deed); In re
Hasie, 206 Fed. 789 (N.D. Tex. 1913) (same); In re Franklin Brewing Co, 249
Fed. 333 (C.C.A. 2d, 1918) (clause in mortgage giving bondholders right to bid
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courts as changes merely in the remedy rather than in the substantive rights
of the creditor, the property subject to liens has always been sold at a public
sale at which the creditor might bid to protect his interest. Until recently,
provisions for compositions in bankruptcy had not been extended to secured
creditors ;44 and Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act,45 which authorizes an
extension of time for payment of secured debts upon consent of a majority
in number and amount of all creditors, expressly provides that such exten-
sion or composition shall not reduce the amount of or impair the liens of
secured creditors. 46
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, which invalidated the
Frazier-Lemke Act 47 as an unconstitutional taking of a mortgagee's rights
in specific property acquired prior to the act, the Court enumerated five
"substantive property rights" of which a secured creditor was held to be
deprived under the act in question: (1) the right to retain the lien until
the debt thereby secured is paid, (2) the right to realize upon the security
by a judicial public sale, (3) the right to determine when such sale shall
be held, subject only to the discretion of the court, (4) the right to protect
his interest by bidding at such sale, and (5) the right to control the property
during the period of default, subject only to the discretion of the court.
The Frazier-Lemke Act provided for an appraisal of mortgaged farm prop-
erty and allowed the mortgagor to retain possession for five years after
default, during which period he might, at his option, purchase the property
by payment to the mortgagee of the appraised value. The mortgagee was
compensated for this delay by the payment of interest at the rate of only
their bonds on foreclosure does not limit power of bankruptcy court to sell free of
liens).
There is a conflict of authority as to whether the court should exercise its power
to sell free of liens where there is no equity in the property. See Oppenheim, Sales of
Property in Bankruptcy Free and Clear of Encumbrances (1934) 29 ILL L. Rav. 67, 77.
And it is apparently the general practice not to order such a sale unless there is a
fair prospect of an excess over the amount of the lien to be administered by the
trustee. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 583-4 (1935) ;
In re Hasie, 206 Fed. 789, 792 (N.D. Tex. 1913). But it has been said that this is.
not a rule of law and is within the discretion of the Court. See In re Franklin Brewing
Co., 249 Fed. 333, 335 (C.C.A. 2d, 1918).
44. Oilfields Syndicate v. American Improvement Co., 260 Fed. 905 (C.C.A. 9th,
1919).
45. 11 U.S. C. § 202 (1935), held constitutional in In re Landquist, 70 F. (2d)
929 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934), cert. denied sub nom. Hardenbrook v. Landquist, 293 U.S. 584.
(1934).
46. Under this statute it has been held that an extension agreement approved by
the requisite majority is binding upon a non-assenting secured creditor who holds the
only incumbrance on a particular piece of the debtor's property, and who, it seems,
would be considered as in a class by himself for purposes of corporate reorganization.
In re Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
47. 48 STAT. 1289, 11 U. S. C. § 203s (1934).
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one per cent or of a reasonable rental value of the property, and he had
no assurance that the mortgagor would complete the purchase. The Radford
case was the authority relied upon for holding Section 77B (b) (5) (c)
unconstitutional;48 and while it is true that the Frazier-Lemke Act gave
the mortgagee far less protection than does an immediate cash payment of
the appraised value of his security, it is clear that the rights enumerated
by the Court in the Radford case are taken from a secured creditor under
subsection (b) (5) (c). The important distinction, however, lies in the
practical difference between a farm mortgage and a corporate mortgage
bond issue, especially as to the effect of a foreclosure sale on the creditor's
security in each case, a distinction repeatedly recognized by the courts.P
Mortgage bondholders in corporate reorganizations have been subjected
to different treatment from that accorded to unitary holders of ordinary
mortgages on farms or urban property. In an equity receivership the tra-
ditional right of a secured creditor to have the property sold at public sale
and to bid at such sale to protect his interest survives as a fiction, for there
is normally only one potential bidder, and the minority bondholders' tech-
nical right to bid is illusory. Under Sections 77 and 77B, even the form
of the sale, the opportunity to bid, and the alternative right to cash payment,
are taken from a minority bondholder by the provision requiring him to accept
securities under a plan which has been accepted by two-thirds of his class
and approved by the court. And although a dissenting secured creditor is
thus deprived of his right to have the property sold at a public sale at which
he may bid, these provisions apparently are constitutional. The Supreme
Court in the Rock Island case gave strong indication that such a provision
would be upheld,50 and subsequent decisions in the lower courts substantiate
48. It is interesting to note that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
which decided the Tennessee Publishing Co. case, was the same Court that was reversed
in the Radford case after holding the Frazier-Lemke Act valid. 74 F. (2d) 576
(C.C.A. 6th, 1935).
49. "The sale establishes the value, and any upset price whatever is a concession
to the known uselessness of an action in such cases. If the upset price be too low,
any creditor must protect himself by bidding. . . . So far as it has gone, the law
has devised no other way to protect against what indeed in practice amounts to a strict
foreclosure, except for the upset price. That judicial sales in such cases are of small
value to creditors I cannot help; it results from applying the same procedure to the
sale of a quarter section and a system of national transportation." Judge Learned Hand
in Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 244 Fed. 485, 504-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
aff'd, 250 Fed. 327 (C.C.A. 2d, 1918), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 672 (1918).
See also Louisville Trust Co. Y. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry, 174 U.S. 674, 683
(1899); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 601-2 (1921) ; Mechanics'
and Metals' Nat. Bank v. Howell, 207 Fed. 973, 981 (D. Corn. 1913). Katz, Protecion
of Minority Bondloldcrs in Foreclosures and Recci,ers ips (1936) 3 U. oF CuL L REv.
517.
50. See 294 U.S. 648, 674 (1935).
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that conclusion. 5 While this affords no direct support for the proposition
that the court may be empowered to bind dissenting creditors to take an
appraised value of their claims, in the absence of approval by two-thirds of
the class affected, it does serve to show that the substantive property rights
of secured creditors enumerated in the Radford case are not entirely in-
violable under the Constitution. For under the Rock Island case and sub-
sequent decisions, a dissenting secured creditor is deprived of all five of
the rights catalogued in the Radford case. Since these rights of a secured
creditor may constitutionally be altered when the requisite two-thirds of his
class has consented, the crucial issue appears to be the constitutional sig-
nificance of approval by two-thirds of a class.
The lack of the consent of a substantial number of the class of secured
creditors may well be considered a stumbling block of considerable impor-
tance in view of the history of composition and adjustment legislation. Since
such statutes in both England and the United States have hitherto consist-
ently adhered to the principle of majority rule,5 2 direct precedents are lacking.
It has been argued, however, that under the circumstances of most modern
reorganizations the consent of two-thirds of a class reflects the vigor of
protective committees in soliciting proxies rather than a considered judg-
ment by security holders, and therefore that the absence of a two-thirds
approval should not alone influence the judge to declare the plan unfair.5 3
It would seem that the absence of such consent will serve as a warning to
the judge and that the finding of the Court that the plan is fair and equitable
to all, made in the light of that warning, is adequate protection for the
interests of the creditors. As for the- right of a dissenting class to cash
payment, there are good practical reasons to suppose that an appraised
value will normally be higher than an upset price,54 for the emphasis in
appraisal is shifted from the necessity of selling the property to a separate
consideration of the claims of the dissenting class who are thus in an excel-
lent strategic position to exert pressure. And the possibility of forcing
dissenters to take securities under the plan by setting the appraised value
51. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935), cert. denicd,
296 U. S. 581 (1935) ; In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935);
In re Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ohio, 1935).
52. The English composition statutes require consent of a majority in number and
three-fourths in amount, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c.59, §16 (1914); the Canadian Bankruptcy
Act requires a majority in number and two-thirds in amount, 9 & 10 Geo. V, c.36,
§13 (1920) ; and the Australian Act requires a majority, Bankruptcy Act, 1924-28, §71.
The reorganization provisions of the English Companies Act of 1929 require a majority
in number and three-mourths in amount, 19 & 20 Geo. V, c. 23, § 153 (1930).
53. Cf. Frank, supra note 20, at 711-12; Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Dcvelopments
under Section 77B (1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 137, 176.
54. See 2 GERDES, COaRORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) §1067; Frank, supra note
20, at 557, 713-14; Sabel, supra note 24, at 58; Wehle, supra note 19, at 219-20.
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lower than the cash value of the securities offered is eliminated by the option
given to the creditor in subsection (b) (5) (c) to take the cash value of
the latter. It is true that a secured creditor under the subsection is deprived
of the right to bid in the property at the sale and to hold it until such time
as values may be restored, and this right may have considerable value in
the hands of first mortgage bondholders. A substitute of comparable value,
however, is provided in the opportunity to retain an interest in the property
through participation in a plan which has been approved as fair by the
court. Another circumstance to be considered is the fact that, in a case to
which subsection (b) (5) (c) is properly applicable, other classes of security
holders are also interested in the property, so that the non-assenting group
may well be a minority of the whole number of interested creditors; and
the court should not be precluded from dealing with the property and the
creditors as a single group, in a manner which it finds to be for the best
interests of all, simply because part of a class, majority or minority, refuses
to consent to a "fair" plan.55
Furthermore, it seems that the doctrine of the Boyd case would apply
to reorganizations through the Bankruptcy Act as well as those accomplished
in any other way n6 The implications of that doctrine would require that
first mortgage bondholders or other senior lien-holders be paid the face
value of their claims, or nearly so, before a plan recognizing interests in
junior creditors and stockholders could properly be approved. This require-
ment, as applied to the questions of fairness of the plan and the amount
of the appraised value to be paid, would serve as a limitation upon the use
of subsection (b) (5) (c) as a means of putting through a plan without
the consent of prior classes, and would seem to provide adequate protection
for their interests. Accordingly, it would seem more desirable to leave sub-
section (b) (5) (c) on the statute books as a discretionary means for
dealing with recalcitrant classes whose object is obstruction, and to apply
the Boyd doctrine as a protection for the interests of senior creditors.
Conclusion. The validity of subsection (b) (5) (c) as a matter of due
process must be tested by balancing the rights of creditors, reasserted in
the Radford case, against the discretionary power which a court requires
for the efficient administration of a corporate reorganization. When com-
pared to its accepted alternative in equity receivership, subsection (b) (5)
(c) seems an unsubstantial change in creditors' rights, which may contribute
much to the efficacy of reorganization procedure. Courts should not find
55. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 35-6.
56. See In re New York Railways Corp., 82 F. (2d) 739, 744 (C. C.A. 2d, 1936),
cert. denied, 56 S. Ct. 959 (1936) ; Frank, supra note 20, at 603; Cf. Swaine, Reorgan-
ization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosenberg in ConRonArn RWI.cA2-
IZATION AMD THE FEzRAL CourT (1924) 104; Kingston v. American Car & Foundry
Co., 55 F. (2d) 132 (C.C.A. 8th, 1932).
